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The COVID-19 pandemic has hit different regions differently.
The current disease-induced immunity level î in a region
approximately equals the cumulative fraction infected,
which primarily depends on two factors: (i) the initial
potential for COVID-19 in the region (R0), and (ii) the
preventive measures put in place. Using a mathematical
model including heterogeneities owing to age, social activity
and susceptibility, and allowing for time-varying preventive
measures, the risk for a new epidemic wave and its doubling
time are investigated. Focus lies on quantifying the minimal
overall effect of preventive measures pMin needed to prevent
a future outbreak. It is shown that î plays a more influential
roll than when immunity is obtained from vaccination.
Secondly, by comparing regions with different R0 and î it is
shown that regions with lower R0 and low î may need higher
preventive measures (pMin) compared with regions having
higher R0 but also higher î, even when such immunity levels
are far from herd immunity. Our results are illustrated on
different regions but these comparisons contain lots of
uncertainty due to simplistic model assumptions and
insufficient data fitting, and should accordingly be interpreted
with caution.1. Introduction
At the end of 2020, prior to vaccination, COVID-19 was spreading
in many parts of the world. In some regions spreading was on
decline, most often owing to the implementation of effective
preventive measures, whereas in others it was on the rise again.
Up until the time when a large community fraction has been
vaccinated (achieved in mid-2021 in many western countries,
but not yet in most of the world) regions where current






































to normalize society, and to keep (or even strengthen) restrictions in order to avoid a new major COVID-
19 outbreak. The minimal overall effect of preventive measures pMin needed to avoid a large future
outbreak (or to make it start declining in the case of an ongoing outbreak) and how it depends on the
basic reproduction number R0 and the current immunity level î, are hence highly important questions
which are investigated here. In addition, we consider the doubling time of a new outbreak should one
take place, which gives an indication of its impact before additional preventive measures would be
implemented.
In [1], mathematical arguments were used to claim that the disease-induced herd immunity threshold
is substantially lower than the vaccine-induced (i.e. classical) herd immunity threshold. However, the
vast majority of regions, possibly excluding sparsely populated regions which might even have R0 < 1,
are not even close to the herd immunity level. In the present paper, we hence focus on immunity
levels (often substantially) lower than the herd immunity level. Such immunity might still give some
protection and here we aim to quantify broadly this effect and study how it depends on whether it is
obtained by disease spreading or by vaccination.
The basic reproduction number R0 quantifies the initial potential of an epidemic outbreak for a
particular disease (or disease variant) in a particular region, and is defined as the average number of
new infections caused by a typical infected individual in the beginning of the epidemic outbreak
(before preventive measures are put in place and before population immunity starts to build up), [2].
For COVID-19, estimates of R0 vary substantially between different regions, e.g. between 2 and 5
among 11 European countries for the original strain of COVID-19 [3].
Preventive measures aim to reduce the average number of infections caused by an infective, by either
reducing the risk of transmission given a contact (e.g. hand washing, wearing face mask), reducing the
number of daily contacts (e.g. physical distancing, school closure) and/or reducing the effective
infectious period (e.g. testing and isolating, treatment). Let p(t) denote the overall effect of such
preventive measures at time t, where 0≤ p(t)≤ 1, and with p(t) = 0 corresponding to no preventive
measures and p(t)≈ 1 meaning more or less complete isolation of all individuals.
Let î(t) denote the community fraction that cannot get infected at time t, a few of these being currently
infectious, but the majority having recovered from the disease and are now immune. At time t, it is the
current (or effective) reproduction number Rt of a region that determines if a new main outbreak can take
place or not. In particular, a region with low current transmission avoids the risk for a large new outbreak
as long as Rt < 1, and regions with ongoing transmission will see a rise in transmission if Rt > 1 and a
decline in transmission whenever Rt < 1.
For simple epidemic models, which assume a homogeneous community that mixes
homogeneously, it is well known that Rt ¼ R0(1 p(t))(1 î(t)), since R0 is reduced both due to the
preventive measures and from the fact that some contacts will be with already infected people.
This implies that Rt≤ 1 is equivalent to p(t)  1 1=(R0(1 î(t))), thus quantifying, in terms of R0
and the current immunity level î(t), the minimal amount of preventive measures needed to avoid a
new large outbreak.
For more realistic epidemic models, this simple relation between Rt and R0, p(t) and î(t) does not
hold. In fact, for many epidemic models acknowledging population heterogeneities it holds that
Rt , R0(1 p(t))(1 î(t)). The main reason is that individuals having high social activity and/or
high susceptibility are more likely to be infected early in the epidemic, implying that individuals
at risk later in the epidemic will on average be less susceptible and less socially active, thus also
infecting fewer if they become infected [1]. Here we extend the epidemic model studied in [1], in
which empirical age-structured social mixing is combined with independent variable social activity
within age groups, to now also allow for variable susceptibility and infectivity within age groups.
(The mixing by age contact rate matrix is given in the electronic supplementary material, where it
is denoted by Ay. It is multiplied by a constant to yield an epidemic having the desired R0.) For
this model, the aim is to quantify Rt as a function of R0, p(t) and î(t), and in particular to
quantify the minimal amount of restrictions pMin for a region having initial basic reproduction
number R0 and current immunity level î (the index t is now dropped and implicitly considered as
current time).
We illustrate our findings by expressing pMin and the doubling time for different regions in Europe
and the USA, but these illustrations are by no means exact. First, the model is clearly a simplification
of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, but even more so the estimates of R0 and the current immunity
level î for different regions contain appreciable uncertainty. Second, we assume that preventive




































certain groups, such as the elderly. Nevertheless our results allow, for the first time to our knowledge, a
risk comparison between regions having different R0 and different immunity level î. oyalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.8:2103862. An epidemic model with age cohorts, variable social activity and
variable susceptibility
The epidemic model is based on the SEIR epidemic model in Britton et al. [1]. Individuals are divided
into six different age groups, and mixing patterns are taken from the empirical study of Wallinga et al.
[4]. Social activity is modelled in a simplistic way not claimed to mimic reality, but still allowing for
variable social activity which is often neglected. Within each age group individuals are divided into
three categories: 50% have normal social activity, 25% have low social activity (half as many
contacts as those with normal activity) and 25% have high social activity (double activity). It is
important to stress that social activity affects both the risk of getting infected as well as infecting
others in that socially active individuals have more contacts both when susceptible and when being
infectious.
To this model with age cohorts and variable social activity, studied in [1], we now also add variable
susceptibility [5], which is done similarly to variable social activity. We assume that 50% have
normal susceptibility, 25% have half that susceptibility and 25% are twice as susceptible, and the variable
susceptibility is assumed to be independent of both social activity level and age group. As a consequence,
our model does not take into account e.g. lower susceptibility among elderly people although this is
partly captured by the lower contact rates for this age group. The choice to divide social activity as well
as susceptibility into three groups as above is of course arbitrary. This choice of heterogeneity structure is
quite moderate in that there is no tail (with individuals having very high or low social activity and/or
susceptibility) and the coefficient of variation equals 0.48 which is moderate (see the electronic
supplementary material for further comments).
It seems natural to also add variable infectivity for individuals who become infected. However, in the
electronic supplementary material we show that such variable infectivity would have no effect on our
results, provided the infectivity is assumed to be independent of age, susceptibility and social activity.
For this reason, we have omitted variable infectivity in our model: a model where also infectivity
varies (independent of age, susceptibility and social activity) would give identical results.
We use a deterministic SEIR epidemic model (see electronic supplementary material) with a total of
6 × 3 × 3 = 54 different types of individuals, but very similar results would be obtained from simulations
of a corresponding stochastic model assuming a large population (which can be proved using methods in
[6], Part I, theorem 2.2.7). The latent state ‘E’ (for exposed) is assumed to have mean 3 days followed by
an infectious period (‘I’) having mean 4 days, thus being quite close to other models for the spread of
COVID-19 [3] (the estimates are based on data from the initial outbreak in Wuhan but are believed to
apply in general since latent and infectious periods prior to prevention are mainly biologically
driven). Details of the model are given in the electronic supplementary material, where it is explained
that, apart from doubling times, our results hold also for the corresponding model in which the latent
and infectious periods are not necessarily exponentially distributed, and more generally for the model
in which infectives have independent and identically distributed infectivity profiles.
It is straightforward to numerically derive properties of the model, such as the basic reproduction
number R0, the time dynamics and its final fraction infected when the epidemic stops (see electronic
supplementary material for further details).3. Prevention
During the outbreak(s), preventive measures of varying magnitude may be put in place. We assume that
these preventive measures do not affect the latent and infectious periods, but only that they reduce the
rate of infectious contacts. More precisely, we make the strong and somewhat restrictive assumption that,
at time t, all contacts (between the 54 types of individuals) are reduced by the same factor p(t). This
assumption can easily be relaxed, but to explore all possibilities of contact reduction is infeasible, and
among all specific preventions the uniform one, where all contacts are reduced by the same factor, is
the most natural choice. Even when assuming such uniform reduction of contact rates, its reduction
may vary in time in different ways. However, in the electronic supplementary material it is shown
that for a fixed overall epidemic size the exact time allocation of the preventive measures has
0.2 0.4 0.6
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Figure 1. Plot of the minimal amount of preventive measures, pMin, necessary to avoid a new large outbreak, as a function of R0






































negligible effect in our model: any time-varying preventive measures {p(t); 0≤ t≤ t0} from the start of the
epidemic up until some fixed time t0, leading to the same overall fraction infected, will have nearly the
same fractions infected among the different types of individuals (see electronic supplementary material
for details). Thus early mild preventive measures will result in the same composition of infected
individuals as doing nothing and then suddenly going to a full lockdown, assuming the two
preventive measures lead to the same overall fraction infected.4. The minimal amount of preventive measures pMin
Consider a large community in which COVID-19 has spread in one or several waves according to our
model with some fixed value of R0, and for which preventive measures {p(t); 0≤ t≤ t0} were put in
place (with the same preventive effect on all type of contacts). We further assume that at time t0 the
transmission has more or less stopped, with a fraction î having been infected (and now immune) and
the remaining fraction 1 î being susceptible. Our scientific question lies in quantifying what the
effective reproduction number Rt0 equals if all restrictions are lifted at time t0, so Rt0 ¼ R0(1 î) for a
homogeneous population that mixes homogeneously. If Rt0 . 1 it follows that a new large epidemic
outbreak may occur if all restrictions are lifted, as opposed to the case Rt0  1 when herd-immunity
has been reached (though smaller local outbreaks are still possible).
In the most common COVID-19 scenario that Rt0 . 1, the minimal amount of preventive measures
necessary to avoid a new large outbreak is given by pMin ¼ 1 1=Rt0 . This amount pMin is thus a
measure of the risk for a new large outbreak. Like the classical formula for minimum vaccination
coverage, this expression for pMin assumes that preventive measures after time t0 are applied
uniformly in the population. Of course that is not the case in practice (see Discussion). Nevertheless,
the values of pMin so calculated are still useful for making qualitative comparisons between the level
of preventive measures required for populations with different (R0, î). In the plots in figures 1 and 2
pMin has been computed as a function of R0 and î, the current immunity level, and is quantified by a
heatmap. The left plot in figure 1 is for the main model allowing for heterogeneities with respect to
age, social activity and susceptibility, and with disease-induced immunity. The right plot in figure 1
shows the corresponding heatmap when there is no disease-induced immunity but instead immunity
comes from vaccinating uniformly in the community (see Discussion on other vaccination policies).
Uniform vaccination is equivalent to disease-induced immunity for a model assuming a completely
homogeneous community. Figure 2 illustrates the same comparison in one single figure. For three
different values of R0, the minimal amount of preventive measures pMin is plotted as a function of the
immunity level, both when immunity comes from disease exposure (solid lines) and when it is
achieved by means of vaccination (dashed lines).
The left plot in figure 1 shows that, for a fixed value of R0, the necessary amount of preventive
measures needed to avoid a large future outbreak decreases quite rapidly with the amount of disease-
induced immunity î, and for î sufficiently large the colour is deep blue reflecting herd immunity. In















Figure 2. Plot of the minimal amount of preventive measures, pMin, as a function of the immunity level î, for three different values






































the electronic supplementary material, figure S1, we show a similar plot for the model allowing for
heterogeneities with respect to age and social activity but not with respect to susceptibility (treated in
[1]). The pMin-values for its disease-induced immunity are very similar to those of the present model
(left plot of figure 1).
When comparing the effect of disease-induced immunity with the effects of vaccine-induced
immunity (assuming uniform vaccination) a difference is clearly observed in each of the two figures.
More specifically, for a given R0 and some positive immunity level î, the necessary amount of
preventive measures is substantially higher if immunity comes from vaccination as compared with
disease-induced immunity (most easily seen in figure 2). As a numerical illustration, in a region with
R0 = 2.5 that has experienced one or several waves in a mitigated situation, resulting in an immunity
level of î ¼ 25%, the required amount of preventive measures is pMin ¼ 29%, whereas if instead the
same immunity level î ¼ 25% came from (uniform) vaccination, then the necessary amount of
preventive measures is pMin ¼ 1 1=(R0  0:75) ¼ 47%.
An alternative way to compare the effect of disease-induced immunity with vaccine-induced
immunity is to compare the corresponding doubling times if all preventive measures are dropped at a
time-point when transmission is very low. To illustrate this some further assumptions about the
generation time distribution have to be made. These follow from the deterministic SEIR epidemic
model and are provided in the electronic supplementary material. If, as above, we consider a region
having R0 = 2.5 and immunity level î ¼ 25%, then the doubling time for disease-induced immunity
equals 12.7 days, whereas it equals 6.6 days if instead the immunity is vaccine-induced. (Electronic
supplementary material, figure S2 gives heatmaps for the doubling times as functions of R0 and î,
both when immunity comes from disease exposure and when it is vaccine-induced.) Consequently, if
all restrictions were to be lifted the epidemic would start growing much more quickly if immunity
came from vaccination. The same qualitative result applies if restrictions are lifted only partially but
still below pMin (the necessary amount of prevention to avoid a new large outbreak).5. Specific regions
We now use estimates of R0 and immunity levels î (prior to the second wave) for a few different groups of
related regions in order to compare the minimal preventive measures pMin of regions within each group.
The regions that are compared are: Madrid versus Catalonia (containing Barcelona) in Spain, Lombardy
(containing Milan) versus Lazio (containing Rome) in Italy, New York State (containing New York City)







































As mentioned earlier, the model is a simplification of the real disease spreading situation for
COVID-19 by neglecting several heterogeneities (households, spatial aspects, social networks, etc.) and
by assuming that earlier preventive measures acted proportionally in the same way between all types
of individuals. However, when fitting to data there is also substantial uncertainty in the estimated R0
and î, so the obtained minimal preventive measures pMin for different regions are to be interpreted as
illustrations rather than exact numbers. Nevertheless, they allow for a qualitative comparison between
regions with similar R0 but different immunity levels, as well as a comparison of regions with higher
R0 and immunity levels with regions having both lower.
For the sake of illustration, we make the unrealistic assumption that all regions have the same mixing
between age groups, the same age structure and the same variation in social activity and variation in
susceptibility. For the two empirical measures, age distributions and social mixing patterns, there are
of course differences between (and also within!) countries but such differences are of minor order
between western countries (e.g. [7]). The only differences considered between compared regions are
the overall rate of contacts (measured by R0) and the amount of preventive measures thus leading to
different immunity levels î.
As described above, it is assumed that there is no or low transmission when applying the
methodology. However, the results apply also to the situation where there is substantial ongoing
transmission, the only difference is that then the issue is not to avoid a new wave, but to make
transmission start declining.
In our comparison, we group regions according to similarity in order to make them better comparable
in terms of similar mixing, age structure and variable activity and susceptibility, and also so that case
fatality data and R0 estimates come from the same data sources/publications within groups. We
assume therefore that within each group regions differ only in terms of R0 and immunity level î, and
use estimates of R0 and î taken from the same literature source. In the electronic supplementary
material, we explain in detail how the estimates are obtained, but briefly it is as follows. The
European country-specific R0 estimates are taken from [3] (except for Sweden for which the estimate is
taken from its preprint [8], see electronic supplementary material for motivation). To obtain separate
estimates of the two Spanish regions we use [9], estimating that Madrid has about 5% higher R0 than
Catalonia (a very conservative estimate of the difference). For Italy, Riccardo et al. [10] estimates more
or less identical (initial) basic reproduction numbers for Lombardy and Lazio, so here we have not
distinguished between the two regions. The R0 estimates for New York State and Illinois are taken
from [11]. We emphasize that all estimates are based on the original virus strain for COVID-19, and
new virus strains seem to have higher R0.
The immunity levels are harder to find estimates of in the literature. For this reason we have used the
official number of accumulated case fatalities per 100 000 individuals in the separate regions as of 5 October
2020 (so before the second wave started), and assumed that the infection fatality risk (ifr) equals 0.5%
(slightly smaller than the earlier ifr estimate for China in [12]). By assuming that all infected individuals
become immune and that there is no prior immunity, this gives an estimated immunity level. Of course,
the ifr most likely differs substantially between regions owing to differences in age distribution and
health care. Further, the choice to set ifr ¼ 0:5% is a rough approximation, as are the assumptions that
all infected become immune and that there is no prior immunity. The region-specific immunity levels î
should hence be seen as illustrations, but their order relations are most likely correct and when this
holds true the qualitative comparison statements remain true.
In table 1, the estimated R0 and the disease-induced immunity levels î are given first. Then comes
Rt0 and pMin, computed from the model for the estimated R0 and î. As a comparison the initial
minimal preventive level required to avoid a large outbreak at the start (when î ¼ 0),
p(start)Min ¼ 1 1=R0, is listed, as is the minimal preventive level required to avoid an outbreak if the
current immunity level î was obtained instead from uniform vaccination, p(Vac)Min ¼ 1 1=(R0(1 î)).
The results in table 1 and electronic supplementary material, table SI are of course contingent on
the estimates of R0 and î, which as we indicate above are rather crude. However, by using the
software provided with the paper, it is straightforward for interested researchers to explore the
effects of alternative estimates of R0 and î on the pMin and doubling times reported in these tables.
(Electronic supplementary material, table SI gives the corresponding doubling times if restrictions
were lifted.)
It is seen that no studied region has reached close to herd immunity, meaning that none of the regions
can lift all restrictions without risking a new large outbreak. By comparing pMin with p(start)Min , it is further
seen that the high levels of required preventive measures at the start of the epidemic have been reduced
substantially in regions that have suffered from high transmission during the first epidemic wave. More
Table 1. Estimates of R0, COVID-19 fatality rates as of 5 October 2020, the corresponding estimated immunity levels î, effective
reproduction number Rt0 and minimal preventive measures pMin. For comparison, the minimal preventive measures needed to
avoid a large outbreak at the start, p(start)Min , and the minimal preventive level when the same immunity instead is achieved by
uniform vaccination, p(Vac)Min , are listed. See main text for further information.





Madrid 4.7 145 29.0 2.4 58.3 78.7 70.0
Catalonia 4.5 77.4 15.5 3.2 68.9 77.8 73.7
Lombardy 3.4 168 33.6 1.5 34.7 70.6 55.7
Lazio 3.4 16.2 3.2 3.2 68.6 70.6 69.6
New York State 4.9 169 33.8 2.2 54.4 79.6 69.2
Illinois 3.1 69.4 13.9 2.3 56.5 67.7 62.5
Stockholm 3.9 102 20.4 2.5 59.7 74.4 67.8
Copenhagen 3.5 20.0 4.0 3.2 69.0 71.4 70.2






































specifically, pMin in Lazio now clearly exceeds that of Lombardy. Catalonia also seems to require slightly
more preventive measures than the Madrid region, but the difference is small. New York State required
much more preventive measures than Illinois to prevent the first outbreak, but after this outbreak both
states required less preventive measures to avoid a second outbreak, and now Illinois requires slightly
more than New York. Among the Nordic capital regions, Stockholm had the highest initial minimal
preventive measures to avoid an outbreak, whereas after the first wave Copenhagen has highest
minimal preventive measures followed by Oslo, but the differences are small.
If instead pMin, values are compared with p(Vac)Min , it is seen that disease-induced immunity plays a more
significant roll as compared with immunity achieved by vaccination. In particular, the regions having
highest immunity levels (New York State, Madrid and Lombardy) would clearly have larger minimal
preventive requirements if immunity had come from vaccination.6. Discussion
The main aim of the paper has been to compare the levels of restrictions needed to avoid new major
outbreaks of COVID-19 for different regions having different initial potential (R0) and different current
immunity levels î. Clearly, regions with high R0 that have not yet experienced much spreading need
to be most careful, but perhaps more interesting is a comparison between a region with high R0
having experienced much transmission, with another region having smaller R0 but also having lower
immunity. The main conclusion from our study is that disease-induced immunity reduces the risk for
a large future outbreak substantially more than when the same immunity level is achieved from
vaccination. Smaller local outbreaks are possible irrespective of region and are not the focus of the
present paper. This result is by no means an argument against vaccination or strong early preventive
measures, both of which we strongly support.
In the comparison of different regions, it is seen that the region requiring the highest amount of
preventive measures may have switched after the first or subsequent wave from a region with high R0
that has experienced high transmission, to another region having smaller R0 but which has
experienced less transmission.
The epidemic model studied allows for individual variation owing to age, social activity and variable
susceptibility and infectivity. The age effect is taken from an empirical study. However, the variation
owing to social activity and variable susceptibility is chosen arbitrarily but the model for variability
lacks any tails and is believed to be less variable than reality. Variable infectivity was shown to have
no effect. Of the studied individual variations, social activity plays the biggest role. The explanation of
this is that social activity affects both the risk for getting infected and the number of people a person
infects, so such variations have a dual effect. Variable susceptibility also plays a significant role, and
mixing patterns for different age groups has the smallest effect on our results.
Many other heterogeneities are ignored (e.g. households, schools and work places, age






































believed that the effect of adding most such other heterogeneities is that pMin is shifted close to
proportionally.
A greater uncertainty lies in quantifying R0 and the immunity levels î. The estimated R0 values are
based on the early, often irregular, growth of outbreaks, which may be affected by local structures and
chance. Further, the estimated immunity levels are based on an infection fatality risk of 0.5% common
for all regions (even though the fraction of elderly people varies between the regions). The estimates
of pMin in table 1 should hence only be interpreted as illustrations.
The model does not allow for waning of immunity. The main reasons for this are for mathematical
tractability and the fact that our time horizon of interest is smaller than one year. Since the fraction infected
even in the worst-hit regions is not more than 30% or so, the community fraction that have first been infected
and are by now susceptible again should be very small. Moreover, the qualitative result that individuals with
high social activity will be over-represented among the immune is expected to apply also when waning of
immunity is taken into account: these individuals will most likely also get reinfected more quickly than
others. Recently, new virus strains have emerged for which immunity from the original strain seems to act
only partially. Incorporation of such effects is beyond the scope of the present paper but is a highly relevant
issue for further study.
An interesting extension could be to consider more realistic preventive measures acting differently
between different types of individual, for example, closing restaurants and bars, having greater reduction
among socially more active people, and school closure, mainly affecting the younger age groups. The
present framework can easily be extended to these situations, the missing information is estimates of how
prevention has reduced contacts differently between different pairs of subgroups of individuals. In many
countries, risk groups including elderly people have been encouraged to isolate even more. If this was
included in the model for prevention, the disease immunity would be distributed even more efficiently in
that elderly people with lower mixing rates would have even smaller fractions infected.
Itwas assumed that vaccineeswere selecteduniformly from the community.Abetter vaccination strategy
would of course be to select individuals at high risk of getting infected and infecting others, much like how
disease-induced immunity is allocated. Such optimal vaccination schemes have received considerable
attention in the literature recently (e.g. [13]). One prioritized group in vaccination are health-care workers,
and such a strategy might be favourable in this aspect in that they typically have many close contacts,
thus increasing the risk to get infected and infecting other. However, another higher prioritized
vaccination group are elderly people in order to reduce mortality and morbidity, and such a vaccination
policy might be far from optimal if only aiming at reducing transmission, since older people tend to have
fewer social contacts. Most likely the combined effect of these vaccination prioritizations is that it reduces
transmission less than uniform vaccination would do, but on the other hand it reduces mortality and
morbidity much more than uniform vaccination would do.
Many countries have a substantial amount of disease-induced immunity from the epidemic waves and a
usually larger amount of vaccine-induced immunity. The combined effect of these two immunities has not
been investigated, but it seems likely that the effect will be that pMin in this situation lies between pMin when
all immunity is disease-induced and pMin when all immunity is vaccine-induced, assuming the overall
immunity is the same in all three situations.
Recently, new virus strains with higher reproduction numbers are starting to dominate the virus
population. The effect of this is that reproduction numbers and herd immunity levels are increased,
and that the preventive effect of a given level of immunity is reduced. However, the qualitative
difference between disease-induced and vaccine-induced immunity remains.
We conjecture that our two main qualitative results hold true also when adding most of the model
extensions mentioned above. These are that the effect of disease-induced immunity on the minimal
level of preventive measure is greater than that of vaccine-induced immunity, and that regions having
suffered from many infections up until now, may be in a better situation with regard to future
outbreaks as compared with other regions with lower R0 but with no or low immunity levels.Data accessibility. The only ‘data’ used in the present paper is the contact matrix which is specified on p. 4 in the electronic
supplementary material file. The paper uses code to solve the models numerically and to produce the figures and
tables. These are explained in the separate electronic supplementary material file titled ‘herdcodeRSOS.pdf’. In
there, 14 shorter MatLab programs are explained and how they interconnect; all these files are also available in the
electronic supplementary material.
Authors’ contributions. T.B. initiated and led the project. All authors contributed to the analysis and writing. F.B. did the
programming.
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